IRRATIONALITY AND SACRIFICE IN THE vVELFARE REFORM CONSENSUS
/~ f '·i tmportan t CJL.<e stwnm tne controversy over \Vell:are rel:orrnts r 'l... the state should address the problem of children's poverty. Liberals and conservatives approach this question with different philosophies about poor people's childbearing and the relationship between public assistance and children's welfare. Nevertheless, at least since the 1980s, liberals and conservatives have reached a consensus regarding welfare's social harms, the condemnation of recipients' (especially single mothers') irresponsibility, and the promotion of policies designed to reduce welfare dependency, such as work requirements and tougher enforcement of child support obligations. New Republican proposals to slash drastically welfare for children threaten to shatter this consensus and have sent policymakers in search of a new "middle ground." 1 Professor Stephen Sugarman's article, Financial Support of Children and The End of Welfare As We Know It, 2 makes an important contribution to the welfare debate by demonstrating the unfairness of our system, which gives dignified and generous Social Security benefits to children of deceased fathers while doling out stigmatized and inadequate AFD C benefits to children of absent fathers. Sugarman's proposaL however, retains critical elements of the system's unfairness. While rejecting major parts of the conservative agenda, Sugarman proposes a child support assurance scheme that might please conservatives and liberals alike. Yet once Sugarman refutes the conservatives' irrational premises, we are left with this fundamental question: does the state have an obligation to guar- 
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[Vol. 81:2607 an tee at least a minimal level of welfare to all child re n ? 3 I see less room for compromise on this issue . than Sugarm2.n does. V!he n liberals have made concessions in the past, they have consistently sacrificed the interests of th e most vulnerable children, especially black chil dre n. Even so , it .~far-e syste n1.
. lZEJ E CTil'·!G (.=oNS E H.VA T IV E P r~E iviiSES
A first step in analyzing the wisdom of compromising with conservatives is to pe el away the layers of fau lty reasoning that support t heir proposals and see what remains . Sugarman notes several aspects of the conservative age nda that are so extreme that they le ave no room for consensus across ideological lines. I •nant to focus on three related conservative premises that should be rejected : that gove rnment support for poor children is itself a wrong, that poor people's de pendence on welfare is immoral and socially harmful, and that financial support for children should be tied to marriage.
A. Discouraging the Poor from Having Children
C onservatives believe it is immoral to have children when one cannot afford to support them and therefore that the government should discourage such behavior. 4 From this belief follows the conservative view that it is immoral for poor people to have children and that the government should discourage them fr om having children. This sounds suspiciously like social e ngineering, so some conservatives soften the claim by focusing on allegations that welfare mothers m isuse taxpayer m oney rather than discussing their right to bear childre n. 5 Thus, to conservatives, the problem to be addressed by welfare policy is not procre ation by the poor per se, but the irresponsible burde n it im poses on hardworking t axpayers.
Co nservatives avoid the more fun dz:rnental questi on of i:he state 's obliga-+1'r·1s · ro"'"' -d" DOOr c'nl 'lo'ren 1 DY c11v" r:·;. ,-,n qc ·>p~,,;,,~ f--,~-' : : : \'&st rrELjmity of v. ;elfc:.re have only one or two children; in the 2vecage numbe:l' ol' child ren in ~ family receiving welfare is somewh. at smaller than in farn.ilies th2.t do notY Moreover, fertility rates do not 2or:respond to the level of welfare benefits provided by the states. 10 In any event, it would be irrational for a woman on welfare to assume the tremendous costs a nd burde ns of caring for an additional child given the meager increase in AFDC payments that results.U A more plausible claim is that, although poor women do not become pregnant deliberately in order to receive AFDC benefits, they are more likely to become pregnant with the security of i~.._FDC benefi ts to rely on than without them. The availability of \Yelfare lessens the fi nancial burden poor women wo uld otherwise have to bear in having children and therefore reduces their incentive to tal-ce every possible precaution 6 Sugarman, supra note 2, at 2534. 7 
B . Th e Immoraliry of Dependency
Conservatives also advocate AFDC cutbacks on the ground that longterm reliance on welfare is immoral and that the provision of welfare itself causes welfare dependency.
14 This is essentially an argument that, even if the state has a duty towards poor children, it serves these childre n better by denying assistance to their parents. The conservative view holds that the reliance of the poor on welfare (rather than poverty itself) causes social problems, including the perpetuation of welfare dependency into the next generation. Mothers who receive welfare are thought to teach their children a life of dependency by undermining their children's motivation to suooort themselves.
15
' ' Sugarman insightfully points out that conservatives assert no similar condern.nation of long-term dependency on inherited wealth, life insurance proceeds, government agricultural subsidies, and Social Security benefits . 15 of dependency deemed proper in industrial usage became objectionable, "dependency" became an increasingly negative term and with greater frequency was attributed to the fault of the individual rather than the social structure.
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This distinction in the moral outrage directed at different ty pes of dependency parallels the stratification of the A merican we lfare system into two basic categories: social insurance and what is commonly called " ·welfare ." Social insurance (Social Security and unemployment insurance) provides a dignified entitlement to wage earners and their spouses and children, whereas welfare (mainly AFDC) doles out humiliating, undeserved relief primarily to poor single mot hers. 21 Social Security retains its political popularity because it is perceived as an insurance program despite its strong redistributive effects and its depend ent cliems. 1s Id. at 31 6. 19 Id. a t 318. 20 Id. at 324-25. 21 Linda Gordon , P iti ed B ut Not En titled: Single Mothers and the History of Welfare, 1890-1 935, at 1-6 (1 994). We lfare programs that give benefits to poor people from genera! federal and sta te reve nues also include Food Stamps, Ge ne ra l Assis tance, Medicaid , and Supplemental Securit y Income. Eric R. . Soc ial Security it se lf encourages some depend encie s while discou raging others. It "s ubve n[s ] ad ults' sense of re sponsi bility for th eir parents" whil e promo ting wives' dependence on their husbands ' wages. Fraser & Go rdon, supra not e 17, at 322.
to the vvidovvs and childre11 of deceased \vorkers, vvho may e·veri be rr1orf~
ar uuent tl1an tile taxpayers w,1o support tnem.~"'
Tne stratificatio n of the Arne:rican welfare system becomes even more suspect if >.;;;e consider an even broader meaning of we lfare that extend:; beyond ~~FDC and Social Security. Lirtcia Gordon ~f:.!,~re is widespread agre ement tha t A FDC work requirements cannot possibly bring untrained and poorly educated women into fin ancia l self-sufficiency, especially in an economy with diminishing demand for unskilled workers that is structured against women . 27 Workfare programs, which (1993). Sugarman notes that ·• AfDC's budget was only fifty percent greater, even tho ugh its case load was three times larger." Id. at 822. 24 Gordon , supra note 21, at 2. 25 Of th e $711 billion in federa l entitlement spending in 1992, AFDC accounted for less th an $20 billion. D avid E. Rosen baum , Answer: Cut En titl e ments. Q ues ti o n: But How?, N.Y. Tim es, june 8, 1993, at A22 . See a lso Theodore R. Marmor, Jerry L. Mashaw & Phi lip L. H arvey, America's M isunders tood We lfare State: Persistent Myths, Enduri ng Realit ies 86 (1990) ("'At less tha n 4 percen t of total fed eral socia l we lfare spend ing, AFDC is fiscally an insubstantial part of the America n we lfare sta te. "). A less explicit form of p ublic income transfers, those struct ured throug h the income tax system, be nefit high er income groups the most. Kingso n & Berkowitz, supra note 21, at 14. 26 Congress , at least forma ll y, has required mothers rece iving AFDC to enroll in work programs since 1971. See Jo hanna Brenner, Towards a Femi nist Perspective on VVe lfare Reform, 2 Ya le J.L. & Femin ism 99, 115 (1989). Several states ha ve impl e ment ed program s that attempt to force we lfare recipients to work by cutting off benefits "!ftcr two years . Sec. e .g., Jason DeParle , Clint on Idea U sed to Lim it Welfare: Stat es Issue T h e ir Own Plans to P ut Two-Year C e1rbs on Those Gett ing Benefits, N.Y. Times, June 2 , 1993, at A 12. Section 202 of the House Republica ns' Personal Responsibility Act similai"l y reqt1i res s tates to move we lfare recipients into work programs. H .R. 4, 104th Cong., 1st welf:o:rr: e itlv: r r:0n ti n uousl y or intermittentiy , ,,.;l-Jen (Dey ax~ a bi.; w gee
• 'I j ~,
• . Ti.'1e causal connection claimed by conservatives be tween welfare and unwed motherhood may be challenged on similar grounds: no evidence exists that ·welfare is an incentive for women to create single-mother 33 The Personal Responsibility Act introduced in the newly conservative House decla-res t hat ·'marriage is the foundation of a successful society" and "an essential social institution ,, ¥hich promotes the interests of children and society a t large." A list of "the negative consequen ces of an out-of-wedlock birth on the child, the mother, and society ... " follows. Pe rson al Responsibility Act, supra note 26, at § 100. The Act prohibits mothers und er the age of 18 from rece iving AFDC benefi ts for a ny ch ild born out of wedlock, regardless of when aid is sought for the child, unless the mother marries the child 's fa ther or someone w!1o ad opts the child. Id . at § 105(a)(3) . An amendment to the Ho use bill would a llow teenage mothers to receive Medicc.id, food stamps, and vouchers to pay for items "suitable fo r the care of the child. " Mireya Navarro, The tt11s 1s a n o r~~-Ec~:~rve aec1S10n --yvrncn pre1ers encourag rrrg \Vo rnen s econorn1c child care directly to · tic:<n V\.,-iti.l stste st~b siG les . -~0 It is .:; spesially 1Jnlikely that marriage c;r child su pport will eradicate the poverty oi: m os· t black children. Research suggests that there are racial diffe :ren.ses in paths to poverty fe r vvomen . Vvhe r ,as many white women are lefl irnpoverished by divorce , black single mothe rs are more li kely to be the victims of "reshuffled pove rty," caused by the dissolution of a poor two-p arent household.
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Even if marriage would improve poor mothers' financial well-being, this result would not justify affi rmative ly li nking their e conomic options to marriage . But this is precisely the e ffec t of " bridefare" programs that give mothers monetary rewards for m arrying. The New Jersey Family Development Act , for example, allows families to e arn income up to one hundred fifty percent of the poverty line income and still keep their AFDC benefits, Medicaid, and emergency housin g assistance if, and only if, the m other marries. 42 The law, however, denies this benefit to an unmarried woman who lives wi th the working fat her of her children , to a working mother who does not have a hus band, and to two mothers who decide to pool their resources to support their childre n in a single househ old. Measures like the one in New Jersey do no t tie welfare to m arriage in order to end children's poverty; they tie welfare to m a rriage in order to champion the nuclear family and the reby penalize single, independe nt mothers. 3S See S'-lpra note 8 a nd accompan ying text. Efforts to d isco urage single m o therhoo d by cutt ing welfare bene fits h ave fai led , with t he prop ortion o f fam ilies head ed by un married women rising eve n with ben efits fall ing. Jencks, supra no te 4, at 227 . 39 Edelrnsn , supr2 note 9, a t 72; Fen ne ll , supra no te 12, a t 29 1. 40 See ?'!Iartha L A . 
II. SuPPO RTING CH ILDREN THROUGH SO C l r\L SECUR ITY
Sugarman proposes a p lan that has potential a ppeal fo r both conservatives and libe rals; his proposal provides child support assurance ihrough the more favored Social Security system. R at her than abolish che stratiil.-cat io n of \\'e lfare. Sugarrnan's s t r~""tte gy is to exploit it. Ir.: effect . ~~..~ b c~lt cons,_ :-;-\·d it~.:cs at th eir O\\ r: ga1r1e . .SugilL~i l~·:.:·l ·~: prupo:~: <.:~ · --; :~ r; -:~= pii::;hcs this goal by mo ving oue gro up of rnothc1s i1om the dislc; Yv< ,:; : .~ wc lfar<.: rolls to the privileged Socia l Security category . In so c1cing, ti~;; proposa l takes advantage ot the powerfui ap peal offere d by two po pular :nocle ls ot social provision: the insurance mod el that vi ews public 8ssist-a nce as an exercise of self-insurance, 43 and the child support model t h~t re lies on fathers' wages to provide for children's economic well-being.
4
By building on these models, Sugarman's plan ingeniously expands wel·· fare payments to children while maintaining key aspects of the conservative vision. It preserves the distinction between Social Security and wel fare and the linking of mothers' economic security to men, preferably husbands. More fundamentally, Sugarman's plan to tie child support to Social Security adopts the conservative rejection of collective responsi bility to children, appealing instead to fathers' private interests in ensuring the security of their own children.
This plan may have the advantage of blurring the distinction between welfare and social insurance by moving more children into the latter category. As Sugarman realizes, however, conservatives will find any child support assurance scheme unacceptable if it benefits all single mothers . There fore , Sugarman's proposal narrows the group of eligi ble mothers to those who can claim a man's Social Security account. As Sugarman acknowledges, this criterion will almost certainly foreclose teenage mo thers from participating in the program since it is unlikely that the fathers of their children will have worked long enough to q ualify for the 43 Others have noted th e political attractive ness of using th e Social Security mod e l for o th e r we lfare: programs. Se e, e.g., Charles Lockhart , Gaining Gro un d : Ta il oring Social Programs to Ame rican Values 4 (J 989) (proposing that the " design fea tures of social securit y cou ld be adapted for th e development of social merging programs directed a t re duc ing pove rty") . Both John Rawls a nd Ronald Dworkin advance theories of justice t ha t re ly on a model of self-insurance. .!.J See Gordon, supra note 21 , at 37-64 (describing how Progress ive Era welfare refom1ers relied on the norm of the fam ily wage); Garrison, supra note 36, at 476 (" Ove r th e las t twenty years, liberal and conservat ive policymakers alike have increasingly seen in ch ild s upport a key method of reducing ch ildren's poverty and we lf<~re depe ndence .") .
program.
4 5 On the o ther ha nd, wome n who we re once married to the fa thers of their children are give n privileged sta tus unde r the Sugarman plan: they receive care ta ker as well as childre n's bene fit s, eve n thou gh Sugarman concedes that such discrimina ti o n rs " unfai r " and H illogi ca lt~ ] . ·P~~6 r -·~: ) \ · · t r;.z ?. lot of childre n into t h~~ Soc ial Sec uri ty c::1.tegnry i~~ \YO:t t:h :.)i.~2 <t!u~a n · s con~:\-;ss i o n s ro con sc c\·dti \.·c.:) . Atre r alL tcc.; !'ia~,~ mo thers cc· m p.rised only five pe rcent of we lfare re cipients in 1SI91~-n M oreo·;cr, rnost :)f the child re n who wou ld be el igible for Socia l Security bene fit s unde r the Sugarman pla n would re ceive la rger benefits t ha n they c1..:rren tly do ~nde r AFD C; addition all y, m others could suppleme n t the bene flt s wit h earni ngs a nd child support. N evertheless, Sugarma n's p rop osa l excludes no t only the child re n of teenage m o thers, but also all children whose father s did no t work long enough to be in sured fo r Soci a l Security p urposes. F urt he rmore, some never-ma rried m o thers would be una ble to claim ben efits because of complications in proving p a te rnity, while ma n y m ore mo th ers would receive inad equa te be ne fits. A lthough it is relatively easy for a worke r to earn enough to be eligible for Social Security benefits, the children of fathers who h ave work ed at lo w wage jobs, on ly sporadically o r over a short period of time, wo uld be e ntitled to only minimal benefits. 48 Indeed, some of the childre n cove red by Sugarman 's p rogr am wo uld receive benefits that are substantially lowe r than wha t they cu rrently receive under AFDC.
49
45 Suga m1a n , supra note 2, a t 2562 & n .109. Thus , Suga rm a n's sc he m e has th e sa me effe ct as does the Personal Res ponsibility Act 's denial of A FDC to unwe d m othe rs unde r the age of 18 . See Persona l Resp on sibility Act , supra n o te 26, § 105. 46 S uga rma n, sup ra no te 2, a t 2564.
-l7 i\iiink , sup ra note 29, at 895. 48 Because e ligibil ity is tied to an ind ividu al's la bor market history and a ttachmen t, Socia! Security ·'fa vo rs individ uals who have a long, continuo us, a nd fu ll-ti me wo rk hi story." Karl E. I<lare, Toward New St ra tegies For Low-Wage Workers, 1 P ub. Int e res t LT. 1, 17 (1995 ) . See gene rall y K ingson & Berkowitz, supra note 21, a t 57-5 9 (de scribing Social Security eligib ility requ irements) . 
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The limited success of efforts to collect child suppo rt provide s further e vide nce that the benefi ts will probably be inadequate for many childr<:n under Sugarman's scheme . A lthough Sugarman has devised a n ove l 'Nay o f collecting support from fathers, the ide a of turning to child sup port .as a metho d of red uci ng chilclrcr: 's poverty and we lfare de pen de nc::: is no t new. 50 e nable less than ten perce nt of families on welfare to rise above the pov· e rty levet5 3 Thus , while the state should vigorously assist mothers who seek child support from fath ers with de cent incomes, we cannot rely on child support to end chil d poverty.
The children who would be excluded from Sugarman's m odel or w ho would receive reduced benefits under his plan are disproportio n ately black; meanwhile , the child re n who would benefit m ost are dispro portionately white. This is because white m others are more likely to become poor as a result of separation from the fa ther, and white fa thers are m ore likely to earn the wages necessary to ensure adequate child assurance benefits.
54 In addition , the marriage requirement Sugarman proposes for 50 See Garrison , supra not e 36, at 476-79 . For anothe r child support ass ura nce schem e, see Irwin Garfin ke l, A ss uring Chi ld Supp ort (1992) . 51 Garrison , supra no te 36, a t 47 6. Th e Pe rsonal Respon sibility Act reduces or de ni es AFDC bene fits for a ch ile! whose pa terni ty has not been es ta biish ed . See Personal Respons ibility Act , supra not e 26. a t § 101.
52 Ga rrison , supra no te 36, a t 489, 502 (obse rving that '· [n] o chi ld support p olicy ca n ra ise the incom e of a child su pport obligor, nor can it recreate t he economies of scal e ava ilable to an int act ho use ho ld"). caretaker benefits would disq ualify most black mothers in the program since most black children are bom to rr.\others who never married. 55 Sugarman' s response to the exclus ion of these child ren from his plan is to propose that their fathers be requi red to work . V./ork programs directed at fat hers have a better chance of ::;uccess than those directed <H sl ngle rno tb!~:cs~ tle.cJLJ.SC rn:.:n en\:e.r c -~~-l CJ~~c --'~:: _~v· cratj le job marJ:~c t ar.t(J ttSi)~· a1ly C'::t t.: Lt=:::-t :rin:Jcreci ·L :~: !~L_~~,~l CCL :.·-:; ~--:.::~~.f..!·.) ... ~_:.-: _ ;_~~~-~2-~;S i~-l t!.iSil e f~-CiJ:"t · L·..J and to keep a j ob:~c~ Despite 1hese (e l~1£l\'~ ::; _ cvc~ntct g e~~ flO'ivever, . . · .De aring dow n'' on ch ronically unemployed Ltfv: rs · i not produce the jobs or income needed to lift their child re n ou t ol: poveny.
57 SugaEna n's proposal also subjects the excl uded mothers to rnc,rc:: intense government super· vision than those who are lucky eno ug h to ql1.alify for the nevv So ci,sl Security benefi ts; the assumption here seems to be that the latter group 's connection to wealthier men improves their ability to parent.
III. T H E Hr sTO R Y OF SAcRIFICE o F BLACK CH ILD REN ' s INTERESTS
R ecent historical accounts of America 's welfare system demonstrate that its stinginess in providing benefit s to the poor stems not from noble conservative or liberal ideals, b ut from racist unwillingness to include blacks as full citizens and from reliance on the patriarchal norm of the male breadwinner. 5 8 This history suggests that the very exclusion of poor black children and increased governmen t supervision of their parents will help to garner support for Sugarman's proposal. Indeed, I suspect that the main appeal of a child assurance program to m any whit e fathers is that it would force them to support their own children , rather than others who are black . 59 Sugarman, too, acknowledges the racial u ndercurrent of 5~ See, e.g. , Gordon, supra note 21 (argui11g that Southern congressmen specificall y exclude d blacks fro m Socia! Se·~ur it y programs to l~·~ep th em in low-paying, m en ia l jobs); J ill Q ua dagno , The Color of \i\fclfare : Hmv :Racism U ndenn ined t he 'Nar on Poverty (1994) (noting tha t Social Security acts we re c;-eated as a i·ac ia!ly segregated sys te m ). debates about welfare policy , noting that liberals remain wary that attacks on the poor are disguised attacks on racia l and other minorities.
60
It seems, however, that li berals' unease about racial discrimination has no t deterred them from sacrificing the imerests of black children in order to m ake political bargains wit h conservatives.
J-: . . 1~1erica 's ·.,~/e lfare system origins~ecl_ in the Proares::;ive Era, the result of femi nist reformers' co ncern for cl io:: pjjg_ht of ooor single mothers, cou-
pled \Vi th the ir misguided faith in mothers' economic dependence on their husbands ' "family wage. " 61 H:e mate rnalist welfare legislation the y ::; :~cured \vas intended for white widows only: government workers distributed benefits according to standards that effec tive ly excluded black mothers . 62 The New Deal expanded upon this system, installing the stratified and uneq ual provision of public assistance through Social Security and Aid to D ependent Children. 63 Whereas Social Security recipients -were entitled to their benefits, welfare recipients were subjected to a regii11e of means-testing, morals-testing, home visits and low payments. 64 Social Security also incorporated the Progressives' reliance on maleearned wages to meet the needs of families. Northern and Southern Democrats struck a deal that systematically denied blacks eligibility for Social Security benefits, 65 omitting fe deral eligibility standards and excluding agricultural worke rs and domestic servants in a deliberate effort to maintain a black menial labor caste in the South. 66 Even Aid to De pendent Children was created for white mothers, who were not expected to work.
67
The 1960s War on Poverty was an effort, propelled by the Civil Rights Movement, to e liminate the racial barriers of New Deal programs and to integrate blacks into the national political economy. 68 It forced states for The ·war on Po·ve rty progra ms' li nk to bl8r:ks' civil rights, however, is precisely what doomed them: whites opposed these programs as an infringement on their economic right to discriminate against blacks and a thre at to their political supremacy. 71 As a res1J lt, many of the V/ar on Poverty programs were dismantled altogether. 72 Meanwhile, as AFDC became increasingly associated with black mothers , it became increasingly burdened with behavior modification, 'Nork requirements and reduced effective benefit levels. 73 The public association of welfare with black single mothers converged with already-existing stereotypes about black people's laziness, fecundity and irresponsibility?
4
More recently, the so-called consensus between liberals and conservatives on work programs turned out to be a "Faustian bargain": 75 conservatives were able to legislate work requirements and time limits, but failed to fund liberal provisions for job training, subsidized child care, health care, job creation and other essential services. 76 Work requirement programs like this one, terminating benefits afte r two years , also dispropor-
tionately disadvantage blacks, who are fa r less likely than whites to escaoe the need for welf8.re \Vithin a short oeriod of time. ' It would abo lish th e si:ratifi c8.tion 0~1sed on notions of ·\;arned' ' entit iemems and '·undeserved" hand outs. lt wou ld p lace indi vid ual wel fare programs in the larger context of the e ntire welfare state and its role in fos tering citizenship . It would rely on a collective obligation to poor families, rathe r than on fathers' private interest in their own children. And it would provide public financial assistance as part of a broader program to rest ructure economic, social and political institutions to make them more egalitarian, democratic and just. The last few times I wrote about American welfare policy, I ended o n a pessimistic note; I expressed doubt that the majority of white Americans would treasure poor black children enough to seek to bring them into full membership in the national community, and I wondered how an expanded welfare state would compensate white Americans for their loss of racial privilege.
78 Still, it would be possible to achieve the agenda I just mentioned by building political coalitions among those who share a common interest in implementing an inclusive and redistributive program.
Liberal and progressive welfare reformers have suggested a n umber of strategies for this sort of coalition building. Some advocate programs that base eligibility on universal criteria as a way of eliminating we lfare's stratified structure and building broad-based support. 79 Mary Jo Bane :M:idd le-class, woT!<:ing class, a:1d jobless poor mothers share an interest in transforming the ge nd.ered division of labor tha't assigns unpaid caretaking tasks to women without public support and structures the wo~kplace around men's need s. Other feminist reformers have emphasized th e unifying theme that mothers' labor in the home as well as in the market should be valued and compensated.
88
Of course, such alliances ' Will be difficult to forge. These groups will have to make politica l compromises among themselves to resolve conflicting interests, strategies, and uo tions of justice , just as liberals an d conservatives have bargained over welfare policy. 111e allure of white privilege continues to pose a forrnidable obstacle to radical reform. Ye t I place far more hope in the possibility of forming progressive coalitions to achieve economic, racial and gender justice than I would in any welfare "consensus" reached between liberals and conservatives. 87 Id. at 853. See also Bren ner, supra note 26, at 127-28 (proposing all iances between groups of women based on a poli tics that emphas izes combining work with parenting for al l families) .
ss See, e.g., Funiciello, supra note 11, at 269 -72, 308-09 (advocating accounting wom en's work in the home as part of 1:h.e gross n2,tion ai prod uct); Pearce, supra note 27, at 275 (arguing that th e welfare system cannot be fun da mentally changed wi thout cha llenging the distincti on between women's paid work in the JY1arke t and unpaid work in the home). See also Martha A . Fineman, The j'.feutered Mother, the Sexua l Family and Other Twentieth Century Tragedi es (1995) (arguing that the ailocation of depe ndent care is typica lly gendered and that gendered role divisions fru strate the family 's ability as a social instituti on to care for de penden ts); Finernan, supra note 40 (sam e) . On th e debate among feminists about whe ther the ir welfare strategy should center on providing working m others with support or on demanding payments for women to care for their ch ildren, see Brenner, supra note 26, at 125-29.
